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Democracy and Dissent: 
Reconsidering the Judicial Review  
of the Political Sphere 
Yasmin Dawood* 
Although there exists a lively debate as to whether dissenting opin-
ions at the Supreme Court serve to enhance democratic legitimacy or 
undermine it, the specific issue of “dissenting about democracy” has re-
ceived little attention. This article therefore focuses on the role of 
dissenting opinions when the topic before the Court is the democratic 
system itself. In its law of democracy decisions,1 the Court has addressed 
                                                                                                             
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, University of Toronto. I am grateful to Benjamin 
Berger, Jamie Cameron, Sonia Lawrence, Carissima Mathen, and anonymous reviewers for very 
helpful comments and conversations. My thanks as well to Sarah McLeod and Tamar Meshel for 
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1 Reference re Provincial Electoral Boundaries (Saskatchewan), [1991] S.C.J. No. 46, [1991] 2 
S.C.R. 158 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Saskatchewan Reference”] (electoral boundary drawing); Sauvé v. 
Canada (Attorney General), [1993] S.C.J. No. 59, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé I”] 
(inmate voting rights); Haig v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), [1993] S.C.J. No. 84, [1993] 2 
S.C.R. 995 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Haig”] (residency requirements during referenda); Harvey v. 
New Brunswick (Attorney General), [1996] S.C.J. No. 82, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 876 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter 
“Harvey”] (membership in provincial legislatures); Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General), [1997] 
S.C.J. No. 85, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 569 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Libman”] (referendum spending limits); 
Thomson Newspapers Co. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1998] S.C.J. No. 44, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 877 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Thomson Newspapers”] (public opinion polls); Sauvé v. Canada (Attorney 
General), [2002] S.C.J. No. 66, [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Sauvé II”] (inmate voting 
rights); Figueroa v. Canada (Attorney General), [2003] S.C.J. No. 37, [2003] 1 S.C.R. 912 (S.C.C.) 
[hereinafter “Figueroa”] (benefits for political parties); Harper v. Canada (Attorney General), 
[2004] S.C.J. No. 28, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Harper”] (third party election 
spending); R. v. Bryan, [2007] S.C.J. No. 12, [2007] 1 S.C.R. 527 (S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Bryan”] 
(distribution of election results); Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, [2012] S.C.J. No. 55, [2012] 3 S.C.R. 76 
(S.C.C.) [hereinafter “Opitz”] (contested elections and the entitlement to vote). 
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various aspects of the democratic system, including electoral redistrict-
ing, campaign finance, referenda and opinion polls.2 
It is striking that the Court’s law of democracy cases have a much 
higher rate of dissent (approximately 65 per cent) as compared to the 
average rate (approximately 35 per cent).3 Consider, for instance, the 
Court’s recent decision in Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj, a case which concerned 
a contested election in the Etobicoke Centre Riding.4 The Court was 
sharply divided. In a 4-3 decision, the majority and dissenting opinions 
laid forth divergent approaches as to how courts should determine the 
entitlement to vote.5 The Opitz decision is yet another law of democracy 
case in which there is considerable disagreement among the justices.  
This article examines the phenomenon of “dissenting about democ-
racy”, and in particular, it seeks to understand why there is so little 
consensus on the Supreme Court with respect to its law of democracy 
cases. My central claim is that the high rate of dissent is driven in part by 
a fundamental disagreement about the nature of democracy itself. While 
the Court’s law of democracy cases are concerned with differing legal 
issues, there is an underlying problem that unites them. Specifically, 
I argue that these cases present the following conceptual puzzle: is the 
electoral system best conceived as a constitutional entity or a political 
entity? On the one hand, the democratic process is a product of a wide 
array of constitutional provisions, rights and rules. On the other hand, the 
democratic process is the quintessential site of politics. 
I refer to this puzzle as the “framework/politics” problem. The puz-
zle underlying many cases is whether the electoral process is better seen 
as belonging to the overarching constitutional framework, or whether it 
is better viewed as belonging to the political activity that takes place 
within this framework. I argue that the framework/politics problem lies at 
the heart of the divide between the majority and the dissenting justices in 
many of the Court’s law of democracy cases. These cases often turn on 
                                                                                                             
2 The Court’s law of democracy cases have arisen under s. 3 (the right to vote), s. 2(b) and 
2(d) (freedoms of expression and association), and s. 15 (equality guarantee) of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the 
Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11 [hereinafter “Charter”]. Colin Feasby, “Constitutional 
Questions About Canada’s New Political Finance Regime” (2007) 45 Osgoode Hall L.J. 514, at 539 
(defining the law of the political process as encompassing decisions that fall under ss. 3, 2 and 15). 
3 See Part II.1. 
4 Opitz, supra, note 1.  
5 See discussion of Opitz in Part II.2. 
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divergent approaches to the issue of judicial deference.6 Those justices 
who characterize the electoral process as “political” tend to defer to the 
legislature with respect to electoral laws. By contrast, those justices that 
conceive of the electoral system as part of the constitutional framework 
tend to subject the electoral law to greater scrutiny. Thus, the divide on 
the Court is often rooted in a fundamental disagreement about the proper 
characterization of the electoral process. 
This article examines the framework/politics problem, and shows 
how it arises in a wide array of the Court’s law of democracy cases. Even 
though these cases are concerned with different legal issues, they are 
united by the fundamental question of whether the Court should treat the 
electoral process as primarily belonging to the political sphere or the 
constitutional framework. In recent cases, a majority of the Court has 
tended to treat the electoral process as “political”, and for this reason, it 
has deferred to the legislature when evaluating the constitutionality of 
electoral laws. I argue, however, that the electoral process is better con-
ceived of as a dual constitutional-political entity. The main implication of 
this observation is that the Court should not automatically defer to the 
legislature on the grounds that the electoral process is political.  I claim 
that the Court’s role is to protect the fairness and legitimacy of the de-
mocratic process,7 and this means that it must subject the political 
aspects of the electoral process to constitutional limits. Instead of defer-
ring to the legislature on the basis that the electoral system is political, 
the Court should subject electoral laws to greater scrutiny to ensure that 
these laws do not undermine constitutionally protected rights.  
This article proceeds in three sections. Part I examines two main ap-
proaches to dissenting opinions and democracy: the legitimacy-detracting 
view and the legitimacy-enhancing view, respectively. Part I also provides a 
comparative analysis of the rates of dissent at the Supreme Court of Canada 
and the U.S. Supreme Court, respectively. Part II begins with a quantitative 
analysis of the rate of dissenting opinions in the Supreme Court of Canada’s 
law of democracy cases. It then engages in a discussion of the Court’s most 
                                                                                                             
6 Yasmin Dawood, “Democracy and Deference: The Role of Social Science Evidence in 
Election Law Cases” (forthcoming Nat. J. Const. L. 2013) [hereinafter “Dawood, ‘Democracy and 
Deference’”]. 
7 Yasmin Dawood, “Electoral Fairness and the Law of Democracy: A Structural Rights 
Approach to Judicial Review” (2012) 62 U.T.L.J. 499, at 504-505 [hereinafter “Dawood, ‘Electoral 
Fairness’”]. 
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recent election law case, Opitz v. Wrzesnewskyj. Part III turns to a considera-
tion of the “framework/politics” puzzle, and shows how it manifests in 
various decisions. In addition, it considers how the Court should address the 
duality of the electoral system. This Part argues that the Court’s role is to 
secure the fairness and legitimacy of the democratic process, and for this 
reason the Court must ensure that the political aspects of the electoral system 
are subject to constitutional limits. 
I. DISSENTING OPINIONS: THEORY AND TRENDS 
There are two main conceptual approaches to the role and function of 
dissenting opinions, which can be labelled the legitimacy-detracting view 
and the legitimacy-enhancing view, respectively. Some people argue that 
dissents detract from the legitimacy and authority of law. Chief Justice 
Roberts of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, views dissents as a 
“symptom of dysfunction” that weakens the authority of the court be-
cause internal divisions are revealed.8 The legitimacy-detracting view 
can be further subdivided into the institutional approach and the interpre-
tive approach.9 The institutional approach is based on the idea that 
institutions must speak with a single voice in order to uphold the rule of 
law.10 That is, the Court’s public statements should not be the statements 
of individual justices. Dissenting opinions disrupt the institutional ap-
proach because the opinions are attached to specific justices rather than 
to the Court as a public institution. The interpretive approach is based 
upon a conception of objectivity and compliance with the rule of law.11 
That is, the law produces determinate and objective outcomes. Dissent-
ing opinions disrupt the interpretive approach because they suggest that 
there is no one legal resolution to a given problem.  
According to the legitimacy-enhancing view, dissenting opinions play 
a crucial role in protecting and furthering rule of law values. Justice 
Brennan of the U.S. Supreme Court argues, for instance, that “the right to 
dissent is one of the great and cherished freedoms” in a democratic 
                                                                                                             
8 Todd M. Henderson, “From Seriatim to Consensus and Back Again: A Theory of 
Dissent” (2007) 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 283, at 283 [hereinafter “Henderson”]. 
9 Kevin M. Stack, “The Practice of Dissent in the Supreme Court” (1995) 105 Yale L.J. 
2235, at 2237 [hereinafter “Stack”]. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
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system.12 One purpose of dissents is to point out the flaws in the majority’s 
reasoning. Dissents are thus “offered as a corrective in the hope that the 
Court will mend the error of its ways in a later case”.13 In a similar vein, 
Ginsburg J. observes that dissents serve to strengthen the majority opinion 
because the majority justices have to respond to the concerns of the 
dissenting justices.14 Judge Diane Wood likewise argues that dissents hold 
the majority accountable.15 Another advantage to dissents is that they 
provide practical guidance to future litigants about how to distinguish 
subsequent cases.16 Dissents also add to the marketplace of ideas.17  
Some commentators argue that dissents enhance democratic legiti-
macy because they are an instance of reasoned discourse.18 Kevin Stack 
contends, for example, that dissents can be justified under the theory of 
deliberative democracy.19 He argues that the U.S. Supreme Court’s po-
litical legitimacy “depends in part upon the Court reaching its judgments 
through a deliberative process”.20 While a unanimous opinion provides 
reasons, the presence of a dissenting opinion demonstrates reasoned dia-
logue or the exchange of reasons.21 The practice of dissent promotes 
deliberation and is thus in keeping with democratic principles.22 
There are well-known dissents that have shaped the evolution of the 
law and made it better over time.23 Dissents are at times vindicated when 
the Supreme Court changes its course, when the Constitution is amended, 
                                                                                                             
12 William J. Brennan, Jr., “In Defense of Dissents” (1985) 37 Hastings L.J. 427, at 438 
[hereinafter “Brennan”]. 
13 Id., at 430. 
14 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “Remarks on Writing Separately” (1990) 65 Wash. L. Rev. 133, 
at 139. 
15 Diane P. Wood, “When to Hold, When to Fold, and When to Reshuffle: The Art of Decision 
Making on a Multi-Member Court” (2012) 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1445, at 1445 [hereinafter “Wood”]. 
16 Brennan, supra, note 12, at 430. 
17 Id., at 435. 
18 Note, “From Consensus to Collegiality: The Origins of the “Respectful” Dissent (2011) 124 
Harv. L. Rev. 1305, at 1315-16; Peter Bozzo, Shimmy Edwards & April A. Christine, “Many Voices, One 
Court: The Origin and Role of Dissent in the Supreme Court” (2011) 36 J .Sup. Ct. Hist. 193, at 194. 
19 Stack, supra, note 9, at 2236. 
20 Id. 
21 Id., at 2257. 
22 Id., at 2246. 
23 Henderson, supra, note 8, at 329, 335. The examples of law-changing dissents that are 
routinely referred to in the United States include Justice Curtis’ dissent in Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 
393 (1857), Harlan J.’s dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 532 (1896), and Holmes J.’s dissents in 
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 95 (1905) and Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).   
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or when legislation is enacted.24 It should be noted, however, that there 
are different approaches to opinion writing in different jurisdictions. At 
one end of the spectrum is the practice in England where opinions are 
issued in seriatim.25 Courts in civil law countries, which issue only one 
decision, are at the other end of the spectrum.26 Courts in Canada and the 
United States tend to take a middle path between issuing a single opinion 
and issuing seriatim opinions.27 Yet even within this middle path, some 
chief justices are known for discouraging dissents. At the beginning of 
her tenure, McLachlin C.J.C. stated that one of her main objectives was 
to increase consensus on the Court.28 Chief Justice Marshall of the U.S. 
Supreme Court was known for insisting on one opinion for the Court.29 
With respect to patterns of dissent at the U.S. Supreme Court, there are 
dissenting opinions in more than half of the cases between 1941 and 1997.30 
Another study finds that the U.S. Supreme Court rendered unanimous judg-
ments in about 40 per cent of its cases between 1990 and 2000.31 For the 
same period, the Supreme Court of Canada displayed a greater norm of con-
sensus with about 60 per cent of cases leading to unanimous decisions.32 
Another study found that the Supreme Court of Canada obtained unanimity 
in over 63 per cent of its cases from 1975 to 2005 in contrast to the U.S. Su-
preme Court which contained a unanimity rate of 28.4 per cent.33  
Chief Justice McLachlin’s unanimity rate from 2000 to 2009 was 
approximately 63 per cent (as compared to 58.4 per cent under Lamer 
C.J.C. from 1990-2000 and 64.7 per cent under Dickson C.J.C. from 1984-
1990).34 The increase in unanimity under McLachlin C.J.C. is greater than 
the raw statistics would suggest because she has a far higher rate of 
assigning panels of nine than her predecessors. Chief Justice McLachlin 
                                                                                                             
24 Wood, supra, note 15, at 1458. 
25 Id., at 1449. 
26 Id., at 1448. 
27 Id., at 1450. 
28 Emmett Macfarlane, “Consensus and Unanimity at the Supreme Court of Canada” (2010) 
52 S.C.L.R. (2d) 379, at 384 [hereinafter “Macfarlane”]. 
29 Wood, supra, note 15, at 1450. 
30 Henderson, supra, note 8, at 333. 
31 Benjamin Alarie & Andrew Green, “Charter Decisions in the McLachlin Era: Consensus 
and Ideology at the Supreme Court of Canada (2009) 47 S.C.L.R. (2d) 475, at 476, 486 [hereinafter 
“Alarie & Green”]. 
32 Id., at 476, 486. 
33 Macfarlane, supra, note 28, at 380. 
34 Id., at 385. 
(2013), 63 S.C.L.R. (2d) DEMOCRACY AND DISSENT 65 
 
assigned panels of nine in 52 per cent of cases, Lamer C.J.C. in 30 per cent, 
and Dickson C.J.C. in 10 per cent.35 Chief Justice McLachlin has also tried 
to consolidate disagreement so that there are fewer concurrences.36 
In the post-Charter period, the Supreme Court of Canada has been 
relatively cooperative.37 The reasons for this difference between the 
United States and Canada could be the fact that the appointments process 
is less partisan and politicized.38 Another possible reason is that legal 
culture is more deferential to the tradition of parliamentary sovereignty.39 
In addition, Benjamin Alarie and Andrew Green have found that the jus-
tices of the Supreme Court of Canada are not as overtly ideological in 
their voting patterns as the justices of the U.S. Supreme Court.40 
II. DISSENTING ABOUT DEMOCRACY 
1. Dissents and the Law of Democracy 
It is striking to observe that despite the general trend toward consen-
sus at the Supreme Court, the law of democracy cases involve a great 
deal of dissenting. Although the sample size is too small to draw any firm 
conclusions, it is worth tabulating the rate of dissent (please see Table 1 
below for the breakdown). 
 
                                                                                                             
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Alarie & Green, supra, note 31, at 486. 
38 Macfarlane, supra, note 28, at 380. 
39 Id. 
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Out of 11 total cases, only four (or 36 per cent) are unanimous with 
respect to the result and only two (or 18 per cent) are unanimous with 
respect to the reasoning. Seven cases (or 64 per cent) have dissenting 
opinions, while the remaining four (or 36 per cent) are composed of 
majority and concurring opinions. Of the four cases that do not have any 
dissents, one case (Sauvé I) consists of a brief paragraph, one case 
(Harvey) has two concurring opinions, and one case (Figueroa) has one 
concurring opinion. Thus, there is only one case out of 11 (Libman) in 
which the Court has issued a fully reasoned decision to which all nine 
justices have given their assent. The rates of concurrence are also worth 
noting: five out of 11 (or 45 per cent) of the Court’s law of democracy 
cases have concurring opinions. The status of concurring opinions is 
somewhat ambiguous because at times concurring opinions closely track 
the reasoning of the majority but at other times they depart significantly 
from the majority’s reasoning. Even if we leave aside the concurring 
opinions, these data show a great deal of dissenting about democracy. It 
is notable that there is a significant amount of dissent even though there 
have been changes to the membership of the Court since 1991. 
2. The Opitz Case 
The trend of dissenting about democracy was also evident in the Su-
preme Court’s most recent law of democracy decision. The Opitz case 
concerned the entitlement to vote and how this entitlement is determined. 
The case arose out of a contested election result in the May 2011 federal 
election.41 In the Etobicoke Centre riding 52,794 votes were cast. Con-
servative MP Ted Opitz won the riding by a narrow 26 votes against 
Liberal incumbent Boris Wrzesnewskyj. The case concerned the entitle-
ment to vote and how this entitlement is determined. In May 2012, 
Ontario Superior Court Justice Thomas Lederer set aside Opitz’s win on 
the basis that 79 ballots had procedural irregularities.42 There was no evi-
dence of fraud or corruption.  
In a 4-3 decision, the Supreme Court overturned the lower court, thus 
averting a new election. The Court held that 59 of the 79 votes set aside 
                                                                                                             
41 For a discussion of the issues, see Andrew Geddis, “Resolving Disputed Elections in 
Canada and New Zealand”, paper presented at the 2012 Constitutional Roundtable, Faculty of Law, 
University of Toronto (unpublished manuscript).  
42 [2012] O.J. No. 2308, 110 O.R. (3d) 350 (Ont. S.C.J.). 
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by the Ontario Superior Court should be reinstated. Mr. Opitz won with a 
six-vote margin. In a majority decision by Rothstein and Moldaver JJ. 
(joined by Deschamps and Abella JJ.), the Court refused to “disqualify 
the votes of several Canadian citizens based on administrative mistakes, 
notwithstanding evidence that those citizens were in fact entitled to 
vote”.43 The majority stated that disenfranchising entitled voters would 
undermine public confidence in the electoral process.44 The Court was 
also concerned that if annulments of elections were easy to do, the “final-
ity and legitimacy of election results will be eroded”.45 For this reason, 
“[o]nly irregularities that affect the result of the election and thereby un-
dermine the integrity of the electoral process are grounds for overturning 
an election”.46 
The case involved section 3 of the Charter, which protects the right to 
vote, and section 6 of the Canada Elections Act47 which sets out require-
ments for how citizens are to satisfy election officials that they are entitled 
to vote. Section 524(1) of the Canada Elections Act provides that elections 
can be contested on the grounds that there were “irregularities, fraud or 
corrupt or illegal practices that affected the result of the election”. Section 
531(2) provides that if these grounds are established a court may annul the 
election.48 The Court majority also outlined the administrative procedures 
by which entitlement to vote has to be ascertained.49 According to the ma-
jority, the procedural safeguards while important, should not be treated as 
“ends in themselves”; such procedures are only a means for ensuring that 
those who are entitled to vote do so.50 Ambiguities in statutory language 
should be “interpreted in a way that is enfranchising”.51 At the same time, 
the procedures in the Act are necessary to safeguard the public’s faith that 
elections are fair.52 The Court majority acknowledged that the electoral 
system “must balance several interrelated and sometimes conflicting  
values ... include[ing] certainty, accuracy, fairness, accessibility, voter  
                                                                                                             
43 Opitz, supra, note 1, at para. 1. 
44 Id. 
45 Id., at para.  2. 
46 Id. 
47 S.C. 2000, c. 9. 
48 Opitz, supra, note 1, at para. 20. 
49 Id., at paras. 13-18. 
50 Id., at para. 43. 
51 Id., at para. 37. 
52 Id., at para. 38 
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anonymity, promptness, finality, legitimacy, efficiency and cost” and most 
importantly of all — the right to vote.53 
There are two approaches, developed by the lower courts, for deter-
mining the validity of an election. The first is a strict procedural approach 
under which a vote is deemed to be invalid in the event an election official 
fails to follow any one of the procedures used to establish the entitlement 
to vote.54 The second is a substantive approach, under which the failure to 
abide by a single requirement is not fatal. The substantive approach invali-
dates only those votes that were cast by citizens not entitled to vote.55 
The majority adopted the substantive approach because “it focuses 
on the underlying right to vote, not merely on the procedures used to fa-
cilitate and protect that right”.56 There are two steps under this approach. 
First, the appellant must establish an irregularity, which is defined as a 
breach of a statutory provision. Second, an appellant must establish that 
someone not entitled to vote actually voted. That is, the irregularity must 
be shown to have “affected the result”. According to the majority, it is 
permissible to rely on after-the-fact evidence of entitlement to vote.57 If 
both these requirements have been satisfied, the court then applies the 
“magic number” test. Under the magic number test, the election is an-
nulled if the number of invalid votes is equal to or greater than the 
number of votes by which the successful candidate won.58 
Having established these standards, the majority went through the 
contested ballots in great detail and found that 59 of the 79 votes should 
be restored.59 Because the remaining 20 votes were less than Mr. Opitz’s 
plurality of 26 votes, the Court upheld the election. The Court did not 
defer to the findings of the application judge on the basis that he had 
made two errors of law.60 Without delving into all the details of each con-
tested ballot, it is worth noting that some of the mistakes made by 
election officials did not, according to the majority, arise to the level of 
                                                                                                             
53 Id., at para. 44. 
54 Id., at para. 54. 
55 Id., at para. 55. 
56 Id., at para. 57. 
57 Id., at para. 61. 
58 Id., at para. 73. 
59 Id., at para. 78. 
60 Id., at paras.  80-81. According to the majority, the application judge reversed the onus of 
proof with respect to two polls, and failed to consider material evidence with respect to two other 
polls. Id. The dissenting justices disagreed with this assessment, finding that the application judge 
did in fact place the onus on the right party. Id., at para. 174. 
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an “irregularity”.61 The majority appeared to draw a distinction between 
“irregularities”, which are “serious administrative errors that are capable 
of undermining the electoral process” and mere mistakes.62 For instance, 
the majority stated that “incorrect record-keeping of vouching, on its 
own, cannot amount to an “irregularity”.63 
The dissenting opinion was authored by McLachlin C.J.C. (joined by 
LeBel and Fish JJ.). The dissent agreed with the majority that the “over-
arching purpose of the Act is to ensure the democratic legitimacy of 
federal elections in Canada”.64 The dissent identified the principle of en-
titlement to vote as the “central pillar” of the electoral system. The 
formal entitlement process is the mechanism by which the electoral sys-
tem strikes a balance between two goals: “enabling those who have the 
constitutional right to vote to do so, and ensuring that those who do not 
have that right are not allowed to vote”.65 
It is worth noting, however, that the dissenting justices had a different 
understanding of the interaction between the Charter-protected right to vote in 
section 3 and the provisions of the Canada Elections Act. According to the 
dissent, the Act sets out a comprehensive scheme composed of three require-
ments: (1) qualification by citizenship and age — as set forth in section 3 of 
the Charter; (2) registration — established by the list electors or by filing a 
registration certificate; and (3) identification — established by identification 
or by taking an oath and being vouched for by another elector.66 
According to the dissent, “qualification” to vote is necessary but not suf-
ficient for “entitlement” to vote.67 A voter must also satisfy the registration 
and identification requirements to be entitled to vote because these require-
ments are crucial for protecting the integrity of the electoral system.68 Chief 
Justice McLachlin argued that the justices in the majority wrongly 
“merge[d] the concepts of qualification and entitlement” because they held 
that “everyone who is qualified to vote and ordinarily resident in the elec-
toral district in entitled to vote”.69 It would appear, then, that the majority 
                                                                                                             
61 Id., at paras. 90, 93, 100, 107. 
62 Id., at para. 24. 
63 Id., at para. 108. 
64 Id., at para. 145. 
65 Id., at para. 151. 
66 Id., at para. 139. 
67 Id., at para. 140. 
68 Id. 
69 Id., at para. 164. 
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gave priority to the Charter-protected right to vote, while the statutory provi-
sions of the Canada Elections Act were viewed as only providing the means 
for ascertaining the Charter right. By contrast, the dissenting justices viewed 
the Charter right on par with the statutory provisions, treating all the re-
quirements (qualification, registration and identification) as being equally 
necessary to establish the entitlement to vote. 
The dissent also said that the Court should not disturb the findings of 
the application judge unless there was “palpable and overriding error”. 
Although the judge erred with respect to some votes, there were still 65 
ballots cast by persons who were not entitled to vote.70 For this reason, 
the dissenting justices concluded that the election should be annulled. In 
addition, the dissent rejected the view that a voter can establish entitle-
ment later.71 Allowing voters to establish entitlement post hoc would 
mean that the accuracy of the election outcome can only be confirmed by 
investigating the voters’ qualifications after the election. Such a process 
would be unfair to those voters who were turned away from the polls 
because they had not followed the necessary steps.72 
The Opitz decision will provide guidance to future courts about how 
deeply to involve themselves in election disputes. A majority of four jus-
tices held that courts should not overturn elections without evidence of 
serious errors that have affected the election outcome. Mere administra-
tive mistakes are not sufficient. Allowing the election to be annulled may 
have sparked further litigation in the future. Both the majority and dis-
senting justices agreed that the public’s confidence in the electoral 
process is the central value at stake in the case. For the majority, an an-
nulment would have shaken Canadians’ confidence in the electoral 
process, while for the dissent, an annulment would have strengthened the 
public’s confidence in the electoral process because it would signal that 
elections would not stand in the face of irregularities.  
III. THE ELECTORAL SYSTEM: CONSTITUTIONAL OR POLITICAL? 
The Opitz decision is the latest in a line of Supreme Court decisions 
in which there is a notable lack of consensus about the judicial review of 
the democratic process. In the Court’s law of democracy decisions, the 
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divide between the majority and dissenting justices often turns on diver-
gent approaches to the issue of judicial deference.73 Those justices who 
defer to the legislature tend to hold that the legislative provision at issue 
is justified under section 1, while those justices who do not defer to the 
legislature tend to find that the provision is not justified under section 1. 
In this section, I argue that the debate over deference is rooted in a 
deeper issue, namely, the proper characterization of the electoral system. 
Is the electoral system best conceived of as a part of the constitutional 
framework or as part of the political sphere? The following discussion in 
the Secession Reference decision is helpful for understanding the puzzle 
raised by the electoral system: 
The role of the Court in this Reference is limited to the identification of the 
relevant aspects of the Constitution in their broadest sense. We have 
interpreted the questions as relating to the constitutional framework within 
which political decisions may ultimately be made. Within that framework, 
the workings of the political process are complex and can only be resolved 
by means of political judgments and evaluations. The Court has no 
supervisory role over the political aspects of constitutional negotiations.74 
The Court states that it has the authority to interpret issues relating to the 
“constitutional framework within which political decisions may ulti-
mately be made”.75  The “workings of the political process” that take 
place within this framework, however, must be resolved through political 
judgments, not judicial ones.76  
I claim that the Court’s approach in the Secession Reference as de-
scribed above sheds useful light on the issue at stake in the law of 
democracy cases. In particular, I argue that the electoral system is best 
conceived as comprising both constitutional aspects and political as-
pects.77 On the one hand, the Constitution creates the governmental 
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structures that form the democratic system. Charter provisions protect 
democratic rights such as the right to vote and the right to freedom of 
expression. On the other hand, the democratic process is the site of poli-
tics. Many aspects of the democratic system are determined through the 
legislative process. For example, Parliament sets out the rules for elec-
tions in the Canada Elections Act.  
Some conflicts arise on the Court because there are divergent under-
standings as to whether the particular issue before the Court falls under the 
“constitutional framework” part of the electoral system or the “politics” part 
of the electoral system.78 In most cases, there is a direct conflict between the 
constitutional and political aspects of the democratic process. In general, I 
argue that the Court should recognize the dual political-constitutional char-
acter of the democratic process. The direct implication is that the Court 
should not reflexively defer to the legislature on the basis that the electoral 
process is political and hence not a subject for judicial intervention. The next 
section examines some of the Court’s cases in more detail to illustrate the 
challenges presented by the “framework/politics” problem. 
1. Competing Views of the Court’s Role in the Political Thicket: 
Saskatchewan Reference 
The framework/politics problem was evident in the Supreme Court’s 
first law of democracy decision. In Saskatchewan Reference, the Court con-
sidered whether Saskatchewan’s electoral boundaries violated the right to 
vote as protected by section 3 of the Charter.79 The case arose because the 
governing Progressive Conservative party passed the Electoral Boundaries 
Commission Act (“EBCA”), which imposed various restrictions on the inde-
pendent boundary commission that was charged with redrawing 
Saskatchewan’s electoral map.80 The EBCA required that the urban and rural 
ridings had to adhere to a strict quota, and that the urban ridings had to coin-
cide with municipal boundaries. In addition to imposing these two 
conditions, the legislation also allowed variances in the population sizes of 
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the electoral districts that were within plus or minus 25 per cent from the 
provincial quotient.81 As a result of these restrictions, the electoral map fa-
voured rural voters and under-represented urban voters.82  
In a 5-3 decision, McLachlin J. (as she was then, joined by La Forest, 
Gonthier, Stevenson and Iacobucci JJ.) held on behalf of the majority 
that the electoral boundaries did not infringe the Charter.83 The majority 
rejected the idea that electoral districts must adhere to the one-person, one-
vote principle. In a key passage, McLachlin J. stated that “the purpose of 
the right to vote enshrined in s. 3 of the Charter is not equality of voting 
power per se, but the right to “effective representation”.84 The majority also 
concluded that the disparity between the rural and urban areas did not vio-
late the right to vote.85  
For the majority, electoral redistricting fell on the “politics” side of the 
framework/politics divide. The majority issued very broad parameters for 
electoral redistricting, thereby providing legislatures and redistricting com-
missions with a great deal of flexibility. In a concurring opinion, Sopinka J. 
also followed the “politics” approach by arguing that the legislature is free to 
impose additional rules on the commission because the commission itself 
was created by the legislature.86 The majority also refused to enquire into 
either the process used by the legislature or its motivations. As commenta-
tors have observed, however, the electoral boundaries at issue in 
Saskatchewan Reference involved partisan rule-making.87 The redistricting 
map enhanced the Progressive Conservatives’ electoral support, which in the 
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late 1980s was located primarily in the rural districts.88 The Court majority 
refused to focus attention on the motivation of the political party in power.89 
As discussed in more detail in Part III.5 below, the difficulty with the major-
ity’s “politics” approach, is that it does not provide sufficient protection 
against partisan rule-making by elected officials.  
By contrast, the dissenting opinion viewed electoral redistricting as 
raising issues that fell within the “constitutional framework” side of the 
divide. Justice Cory (joined by Lamer C.J.C., and L’Heureux-Dubé J.) 
concluded that there had been an infringement of section 3, and further-
more that the government had failed to justify the infringements under 
section 1. Justice Cory was concerned that the legislature was interfering 
with the work of the independent commission, and that the right to vote 
of the urban voters was diluted as a consequence. He alluded to the prob-
lem of partisan gerrymandering, noting that the “haunting spectre of ‘rotten 
boroughs’ is not that far removed as to be forgotten”.90 In addition, Cory J. 
noted that the government provided no explanation as to why the legisla-
ture “shackle[d] the Commission with the mandatory rural-urban allocation 
and the confinement of urban boundaries to municipal limits”.91 Unlike the 
majority, which provided the legislature with a great deal of latitude to en-
gage in electoral redistricting, the dissent held the legislature to account, 
arguing that electoral redistricting was subject to constitutional require-
ments. Justice Cory argued that the “fundamental right to vote should not 
be diminished without sound justification”.92 This approach is preferable 
because it places constitutional limits on the political sphere. As the dissent 
noted, legislative interference with the right to vote risked “bringing the 
democratic process itself into disrepute”.93 
2. The Continuing Debate: Haig, Harvey and Sauvé II 
The majority and dissenting opinions in Saskatchewan Reference 
provided two different approaches to the judicial supervision of the de-
mocratic process. One approach is to treat the electoral process as falling 
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primarily within the political sphere, and to defer to the legislature. The 
other approach is to treat the electoral process as falling partially within 
the constitutional framework, and to hold the legislature to account for its 
regulation of the democratic system. The Haig, Harvey and Sauvé II de-
cisions likewise raise the politics/framework problem. 
At issue in Haig v. Canada was whether section 3 guaranteed the right 
to vote in the national referendum on the Charlottetown Accord.94 In all 
provinces and territories except Quebec, the referendum took place under 
federal legislation.95 In Quebec, the referendum took place under provincial 
legislation that imposed a six-month residency requirement on all voters.96 
Graham Haig, who had moved from Ontario to Quebec during the relevant 
period, was ineligible to vote in Quebec because he did not meet the six-
month residency requirement and he was also ineligible to vote in Ontario 
because he no longer resided in an area covered by the federal legislation.97  
In Haig, the five-member majority treated the referendum as falling 
within the political domain and not the constitutional one. Writing for the 
majority, L’Heureux-Dubé J. stated that a “referendum as a platform of 
expression is ... a matter of legislative policy and not of constitutional 
law”.98 As such, a referendum is not subject to section 2(b) or the Charter 
in general because it is a “creation of legislation”.99 The majority also 
concluded that section 3 was clearly limited to the election of representa-
tives to the provincial and federal legislatures, and hence did not 
guarantee the right to vote in a referendum.100  
In a dissenting opinion, Iacobucci J. (joined by Lamer C.J.C.) argued 
that Mr. Haig’s section 2(b) rights were violated by the effect of the 
federal Referendum Act, and moreover, that the violation could not be 
saved under section 1.101 Justice Iacobucci argued that the two referenda, 
taken together, had a “national character” that was intended to involve all 
Canadians.102 Although Iacobucci J. agreed with the view that the 
government is not obligated to hold referenda, nor follow their results, he 
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argued that if the government “chooses to conduct a referendum, it must 
do so in compliance with the Charter”.103 Unlike the majority, Iacobucci J. 
held that legislative creations such as referenda trigger constitutional 
protections. His approach recognized the dual political-constitutional 
character of the electoral process. 
In its subsequent law of democracy case, Harvey v. New Brunswick 
(Attorney General), the Court considered whether provisions of the 
New Brunswick Elections Act violated section 3 of the Charter.104 
Mr. Harvey, who was a member of the New Brunswick Legislative 
Assembly, was convicted for violating the Act for having induced a female 
under the age of 18 to vote in the election even though he knew she was 
ineligible to vote.105 Under the terms of the Act, Mr. Harvey lost his seat 
and he was also disqualified from running as a candidate for five years.106 
He argued that section 3 provided an unqualified right to run for office, and 
as such, the provisions of the Act infringed section 3.107 A six-member 
majority of the Court, in an opinion written by La Forest J., agreed with the 
appellant that the provisions of the Act violated section 3.108 The majority 
found, however, that the provisions were justifiable under section 1.109  
In dissent, McLachlin J. (as she was then) and L’Heureux-Dubé J. ar-
gued that the real issue in the case is “what power the courts have to 
question a rule of the legislature as to the consequences of electoral corrup-
tion”.110 The dissent asserted that the legislature’s internal proceedings were 
protected by parliamentary privilege, and hence, were not subject to the 
Charter or to judicial review.111 While there is no doubt that corrupt electoral 
practices must be addressed for the proper functioning of democracy, 
claimed the dissent, it is the role of the legislature to respond to actions that 
undermine its integrity.112 For the dissent, the rules regarding electoral cor-
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ruption fell squarely in the political sphere. The difficulty with this approach, 
however, is that it does not provide enough protection to the citizens to be 
free from electoral corruption. The majority’s approach is preferable because 
it subjects the political sphere to constitutional limits but finds that the rights 
violation is nonetheless justified.  
The framework/politics problem was also evident in the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Sauvé v. Canada (Sauvé II).113 At issue in the case was 
section 51(e) of the Canada Elections Act, which denied the right to vote to 
prisoners who had sentences of two years or more.114 The Court was closely 
divided. Writing for a five-member majority, McLachlin C.J.C. (joined by 
Iacobucci, Binnie, Arbour and LeBel JJ.) struck the provision down as an 
unjustified violation of section 3.115 The majority asserted that the “right to 
vote is fundamental to our democracy and the rule of law and cannot be 
lightly set aside. Limits on it require not deference, but careful examina-
tion.”116 According to the majority, judicial deference was not appropriate 
when fundamental rights were at stake. In an important passage, McLachlin 
C.J.C. made a distinction between fundamental rights, on the one hand, and 
social and political policies, on the other: 
The core democratic rights of Canadian do not fall within a “range of 
acceptable alternatives” among which Parliament may pick and choose 
at its discretion. Deference may be appropriate on a decision involving 
competing social and political policies. It is not appropriate, however, 
on a decision to limit fundamental rights.117 
For the majority, the issue fell within the realm of the constitutional 
framework since the right to vote was impaired. By contrast, the dissent-
ing justices described the issue as involving “competing social or 
political philosophies relating to the right to vote”.118 Writing for the dis-
senting justices, Gonthier J. (joined by L’Heureux-Dubé, Major and 
Bastarache JJ.) argued that the “case rests on philosophical, political and 
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social considerations which are not capable of “scientific proof”.119 For 
this reason, the Court should defer to Parliament’s judgment that tempo-
rary disenfranchisement enhances rule of law and democracy.120 The 
dissent’s “politics” approach, however, does not provide sufficient pro-
tection to the constitutional dimensions of the right to vote.   
3. Debating Deference in Harper and Bryan 
The Court’s more recent cases, Harper v. Canada and R. v. Bryan, 
also exhibit the framework/politics problem. Both cases involved provi-
sions of the Canada Elections Act that infringed the freedom of 
expression. At issue in Harper was the constitutionality of third party 
spending limits.121 Writing for a six-member majority, Bastarache J. held 
that while the spending limits infringed the freedom of expression guar-
antee in section 2(b) of the Charter, the provisions were nonetheless 
justifiable under section 1.122 In Bryan, a five-member majority upheld 
the constitutionality of section 329 of the Canada Elections Act which 
prohibited the transmission of election results between electoral ridings 
before the closing of all polling stations in Canada.123 The claimant had 
posted election results from Atlantic Canada on a website while polls 
were still open in other electoral ridings.124 The majority held that al-
though the provision infringed the freedom of expression as protected by 
section 2(b), it could nonetheless be upheld under section 1. 
The divide in the Court in the Harper and Bryan decisions is based 
in large part on competing views about judicial deference to Parliament’s 
regulation of the electoral process. I suggest that this debate over defer-
ence is rooted in a deeper question about the nature of the electoral 
process. The Court majority was highly deferential to Parliament because 
it saw the electoral process as being presumptively “political”. In 
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Harper, the majority asserted that the workings of the electoral system 
are a “political choice” and the specific details of these political choices 
should be left to Parliament to determine.125 Since Parliament has the 
right to “choose Canada’s electoral model”, it is incumbent on the Court 
to defer to Parliament.126 Similarly in Bryan, the majority stated that the 
Court ought to take a “natural attitude of deference” with respect to elec-
tion laws.127 The majority of the Court viewed election laws as 
presumptively falling within the political sphere. 
In both cases, the majority was highly deferential in its treatment of 
the social science evidence. In Harper, the majority stated that the Court 
may rely on a “reasoned apprehension of harm” standard when the social 
science evidence is either inconclusive or conflicting.128 Likewise in 
Bryan, the majority was highly deferential in its assessment of the gov-
ernment’s social science evidence.129 The majority in each decision was 
also highly deferential to the government in the section 1 analysis. In 
Harper, the majority found that the government’s objective of electoral 
fairness was pressing and substantial, and that the legislative provisions 
satisfied the three stages of the proportionality test.130 Likewise in Bryan, 
Bastarache J. found that the government’s objective of ensuring informa-
tional equality was pressing and substantial, and that the provision 
satisfied the proportionality stage of the Oakes test.131  
By contrast, the dissenting justices treated the problem before the Court 
as one that fell within the realm of the constitutional framework. Because a 
constitutional aspect of the electoral system (the right to freedom of 
expression) was at issue in the case, there was no presumption of deference 
to Parliament. For the dissenting justices, Parliament must reach a higher 
standard of justification for violating the right of freedom of expression even 
though it is doing so to achieve democratic aims. In their dissenting opinion 
in Harper, McLachlin C.J.C. and Major J. (joined by Binnie J.) found that 
the spending limits failed the minimal impairment stage of the Oakes test 
because they imposed a “virtual ban” on citizens who wished to participate 
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in the political deliberation during the election period.132 According to the 
dissent, the “dangers posited are wholly hypothetical” because there is no 
evidence that wealthy citizens “are poised to hijack this country’s election 
process”.133 Similarly in Bryan, Abella J. (joined by McLachlin C.J.C., 
Binnie and LeBel JJ.) argued that the provision did not meet the 
proportionality test under section 1. The publication ban was an “excessive 
response to an insufficiently proven harm”.134 Justice Abella also argued that 
the evidence provided by the government was not sufficient to justify 
infringing the freedom of expression.135  
In summary, the majority opinions in both cases adopted a presump-
tion of deference with respect to Parliament. This deference was based 
on a prior determination that the electoral system fell within the political 
realm. By contrast, the dissenting justices treated the problem before the 
Court as one that belonged to the realm of the constitutional framework. 
Because the constitutional aspects of the electoral system (the right to 
freedom of expression) were at issue in the case, there should be no pre-
sumption of deference to Parliament. 
4. Figueroa v. Canada and the Framework/Politics Problem 
In the cases discussed above, the framework/politics problem is a re-
curring theme, but the Supreme Court did not devote much if any 
discussion to it. The Figueroa decision is significant because a concur-
ring opinion provides a discussion of the framework/politics problem 
(without using this specific terminology). In Figueroa, the head of the 
Communist Party of Canada challenged the constitutionality of a re-
quirement that political parties nominate candidates in at least 50 
electoral districts in order to register as a political party.136 Registered 
political parties are granted a number of benefits under the Canada Elec-
tions Act.137 The Supreme Court held that the 50-candidate rule violated 
section 3 and was not justifiable under section 1.138 Writing for the six-
member majority, Iacobucci J. stated that section 3 includes “the right of 
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each citizen to play a meaningful role in the electoral process”.139 The 
majority also found that political parties act “as both a vehicle and out-
let” for the participation of citizens in the electoral process.140  
The dual political-constitutional character of the electoral process 
was discussed by LeBel J. in a concurring opinion. Justice LeBel posited 
that the “government has fairly wide latitude in choosing how to design 
the electoral system and how to combine the various competing values at 
play”.141 The choice among various representative options “should be 
viewed as a matter of political and philosophical preference in which it is 
not this Court’s role to intervene”.142 The role of the Court is to ensure 
that the legislature stays within “constitutional limits”, and in particular, 
to make sure that the values of effective representation and meaningful 
participation are not compromised.143  
Although the government has latitude to design the electoral system, 
it infringed section 3 in this particular case because the regulations pre-
vented the participation of citizens and political parties. Justice LeBel 
argued that parties “enhance representation by making the political par-
ticipation of individuals more effective than it would be if those 
individuals acted alone without the coordination, structure and coopera-
tion that the party system provides”.144 Parties also “keep voters 
informed of important issues and provide them with meaningful electoral 
choices”.145 For LeBel J., the regulation of political parties raises 
“framework” issues. He stated that parties are “such important actors in 
our political system that, although they are private and voluntary organi-
zations, they also possess some of the characteristics of a public 
institution”.146 The number of candidates a party must field “is part of the 
framework for the recognition and regulation of political parties”.147 One 
way of understanding Lebel J.’s and the majority’s position is that 
the regulatory framework essentially shut out or disenfranchised smaller 
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political parties.148 For this reason, the Court majority was not willing to 
defer to the legislature. The Court majority’s decision in Sauvé II is simi-
lar: rules that disenfranchise citizens immediately raise serious 
framework problems that override judicial deference to the political 
sphere.149  
5. Democratic Legitimacy and Navigating the Duality of the  
Electoral System 
Justice LeBel’s approach in the Figueroa case provides a helpful 
guide to navigating the framework/politics problem. Although LeBel J.’s 
opinion was a concurrence, and hence of limited precedential value, I 
suggest that it provides a useful analysis of the duality of the electoral 
system. As a start, LeBel J. acknowledges the dual political-constitutional 
nature of the electoral process. He noted that the government has “fairly 
wide latitude” in the task of designing the electoral system and choosing 
which values are emphasized.150 The choice among these options is a 
matter of political and philosophical preference, and as such, the Court 
should not intervene in the decision to choose one electoral option over 
another.151 The Court does, however, have a role in ensuring that the legis-
lature does not exceed certain constitutional limits.152 Although LeBel J. 
does not provide much detail on what precisely these constitutional limits 
may be, he states that the Court’s role is to ensure that certain values, 
such as effective representation and meaningful participation, are pro-
tected.153 In the context of Figueroa, LeBel J. found that the 
government’s regulation of political parties violated the section 3 right to 
vote. The regulation of political parties undoubtedly falls within the 
realm of the political because it involves the basic design of the electoral 
process, but it is nonetheless subject to constitutional scrutiny. 
Thus, according to LeBel J., the legislature’s role is to choose “be-
tween the various species of democratic electoral system” while the 
Court’s role is to subject these choices to “certain boundaries, which it is 
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the responsibility of the judiciary to delineate”.154 Justice LeBel’s formu-
lation is helpful because it holds that both the legislature and the courts 
have a role to play in the regulation of the democratic system. Although 
Parliament has the power to make choices about the electoral system in 
the political sphere, these choices are subjected to constitutional limits by 
the courts. Crucially, it is for the courts to “delineate” the constitutional 
boundaries of the legislature’s political choices.  
Another reason the Court should treat electoral laws with a certain 
amount of skepticism is that elected officials have a propensity to enact 
laws that perpetuate their own power. The Canadian law of democracy 
literature has examined the structural problem of partisan self-dealing in 
detail.155 The risk posed by partisan self-dealing cannot be adequately 
addressed by a Court that is overly deferential to Parliament.156 As I have 
argued elsewhere, the Court should not automatically defer to Parliament 
in its law of democracy cases on the basis that the government has the 
power to choose the electoral system.157 The Court’s principal role is to 
ensure the fairness of the democratic process.158 To do so, the Court must 
recognize the duality of the electoral system, and ensure that the political 
aspect falls within constitutional limits. 
The proper characterization of the electoral system as either political 
or constitutional (or both) is also implicitly connected to the issue of ju-
dicial legitimacy. If the electoral process is deemed to be a purely 
political entity, then judicial oversight is illegitimate because the court is 
intervening in the political sphere. If, however, the electoral process is 
viewed as being both political and constitutional, then judicial interven-
tion is legitimate. Thus, perceptions about the appropriate judicial role is 
affected by a prior position on the nature of the democratic process as 
either political or constitutional.   
In the Opitz case, for example, the justices were divided with respect 
to the Court’s role in adjudicating contested elections. The majority jus-
tices favoured an approach that leaves the political system to politics, 
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subject to certain very broad parameters. By adopting the substantive 
approach, the majority signalled that mistakes in the administrative pro-
cedures are not necessarily fatal. The majority’s decision also makes it 
less likely that candidates will challenge election outcomes in court. By 
choosing a more difficult standard to meet, the Court was insulating the 
electoral system from judicial review. By contrast, the dissenting justices 
favoured an approach that holds the government to account for its ad-
ministration of the electoral process. By taking a more formal approach 
to the requirements for entitlement to vote, the dissent provided greater 
opportunities for candidates to challenge the finality and accuracy of 
election outcomes in court. 
The Court’s decision in Libman v. Quebec (Attorney General)159 pro-
vides another illustration of LeBel J.’s approach. In Libman, the Court 
considered the constitutionality of the third party spending limits set out 
in Quebec’s Referendum Act, which laid forth the rules for the referen-
dum on the Charlottetown Accord.160 The referendum legislation 
required that regulated expenses be incurred only through a national 
committee, which meant that individuals who supported neither the “yes” 
nor the “no” option were limited to unregulated expenses.161 The Court 
held that the restrictions infringed the freedom of political expression and 
could not be upheld under section 1 of the Charter.162 It found that the 
provisions did not meet the minimal impairment test because the limits 
imposed on groups that do not affiliate themselves with the national 
committees are so restrictive that they amount to a total ban.163  
At the same time, the Court stated that it was important to prevent 
“the most affluent members of society from exerting a disproportionate 
influence by dominating the referendum debate through access to greater 
resources”.164 As noted by Colin Feasby, the Court appeared to favour an 
“egalitarian” approach to the rules governing spending during a referen-
dum or an election.165 The basic idea is that those with greater wealth 
should not be permitted to control the electoral process and thereby dis-
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advantage those with less wealth; that is, disparities in private wealth 
should not be translated into disparities of political influence. The Court 
recognized that Parliament has the right to regulate campaign spending 
and to choose the values underlying election laws, but it also held that 
the specific spending limits at issue in the case unjustifiably infringed the 
freedom of expression. 
In its recent cases, however, most notably in Harper and Bryan, the 
Court majority has deferred to the legislature on the basis that the elec-
toral system is “political” and hence not a subject about which the Court 
should be overly involved. The difficulty with this approach is that it 
does not pay sufficient attention to the duality of the electoral process. 
Although there is an important political aspect to the electoral process, 
there is an equally important constitutional aspect. As noted by LeBel J., 
it is the role of the Court to subject the political aspect to constitutional 
limits. Instead of automatically deferring to the government on the basis 
that the electoral system is “political”, the Court should instead subject 
the legislative provision to greater scrutiny. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article has examined the phenomenon of “dissenting about de-
mocracy”. Although the Supreme Court’s law of democracy cases 
involve a wide array of topics, I claim that many of the disputes between 
the majority and dissenting justices are based upon fundamentally diver-
gent views on the nature of the electoral system itself. The puzzle 
underlying many cases is whether the electoral system falls within the 
realm of the constitutional framework or the realm of politics. I have re-
ferred to this puzzle as the “framework/politics” problem. 
Unless the Court devotes greater consideration to this issue, there is 
every reason to believe that the framework/politics problem will continue 
to present challenges in future cases. It is very difficult, if not impossible, 
to characterize the electoral system as either political or constitutional. 
The challenge posed by the framework/politics problem is that the elec-
toral system is both a constitutional and political entity at any given 
point. I have argued that the best approach to the framework/politics 
problem is to recognize the dual political-constitutional character of 
the electoral process. As LeBel J. argued in Figueroa, it is for the legisla-
ture to choose among different types of electoral structures, and for 
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the Court to subject these choices to “certain boundaries, which it is the 
responsibility of the judiciary to delineate”.166 In recent cases, however, 
the majority’s position has been to reflexively defer to Parliament’s elec-
toral rules on the basis that the electoral system is political. The Court 
should instead recognize the dual constitutional-political nature of the 
electoral system. In particular, this recognition would mean that the Court 
would not automatically defer to Parliament. 
The framework/politics problem also raises larger questions about 
democratic legitimacy and the role of the Court. One view is that judicial 
intervention in the electoral system detracts from democratic legitimacy 
because the Court is encroaching on the political sphere. Another view is 
that judicial intervention in the electoral system enhances democratic 
legitimacy because the electoral process is bound by constitutional rules. 
I have argued that democratic legitimacy is enhanced when the Court 
ensures that the electoral process meets constitutional requirements. 
A posture of automatic deference to Parliament on the basis that the elec-
toral process is “political” diminishes democratic legitimacy because it 
does not hold elected officials to account for their actions. In sum, the 
dual constitutional-political nature of the democratic process requires 
active involvement by both legislatures and courts. 
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